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CAN BUSINESS LEARN TO LOVE THE ENVIRONMENT?
THE CASE FOR A U.S. CORPORATE CARBON FUND
Introduction
Unions of business and the environment are rarely happy ones.  Environmental concerns 
are generally viewed by business interests as unwelcome intrusions and any marriage 
between the two is usually more in the nature of a shot gun wedding than a romance.   A 
spate of such uneasy unions seems poised to occur in the face of increasing awareness in 
the US that global warming (the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere) is a 
problem in need of immediate attention.  This article proposes a means to make such 
unions more harmonious.
The United States’ withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol process in 2001 delayed but did 
not sound the death knell for controls on the greenhouse gas emissions of U.S. industry.  
Even whilst withdrawing the United States from that process, President Bush promised 
that the United States would provide its own plan to reduce global warming.  Efforts to 
address global warming have been ongoing in the United States, on many different levels, 
ever since.  Whilst the Administration has limited its efforts to urging U.S. industry to 
adopt voluntary measures to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions1  there is a rapidly 
growing consensus that the introduction of mandatory controls on greenhouse gas 
1
 As carbon dioxide is the most ubiquitous of the six greenhouse gases (which also include methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydro fluorocarbons, per fluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride), this translates into an obligation to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
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emissions is both necessary and inevitable.  This consensus was captured in a May, 2005 
New York Times editorial,  
Hardly a week goes by without somebody telling President Bush that his passive 
approach to global warming is hopelessly behind the times …… and now he is 
hearing it from the heaviest hitters in the business world, most recently, Jeffrey 
Immelt, the Chief Executive of General Electric. …….. Mr. Immelt believes 
mandatory controls on emissions of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, are 
necessary and inevitable.  And he said he would double investments by G.E. in 
energy and environmental technologies to prepare it for what he sees as a huge 
global market for products that help other companies – and countries like China 
and India – reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.2
The consensus is likely to gain even greater momentum in the face of the devastating 
effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, hurricanes which many attribute to the effects of 
global warming.
Whether the mandatory controls ultimately adopted come from international treaty or 
U.S. government regulation, compliance for U.S. corporations will be costly.  
Conversely, large new markets await corporations that produce technologies that reduce 
emissions.   The academic literature on mandatory controls has mainly focused on the 
pros and cons of such controls from an environmental law and policy standpoint.  Less 
2
 Editorial, Talking Climate Signals, N.Y. Times, May 19, 2005 at A26.
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has been written on the impact of such controls from the perspective of corporate law and 
policy.  This latter perspective is the focus of this article.
The article addresses the question of how and why U.S. corporations should prepare 
themselves for the added expense, or expanded market opportunities, as the case may be, 
that mandatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions will bring.  Should corporations 
who will have to reduce their emissions, for example, do nothing until the shot gun is put 
to their heads?  Should those who will benefit from a new domestic market for their 
products simply wait for that market to develop or position themselves now to gain 
experience and insight into the demands of that market?
.
U.S industry has already begun answering these questions.  Many corporations which 
emit greenhouse gases are building systems to track and monitor their emissions and 
undertaking steps to achieve reductions.  Others, who produce environmental technology, 
have begun mobilizing resources to take advantage of the opportunities presented outside 
the United States since the Kyoto Protocol began to take shape. These measures are 
important first steps but I argue that they contain a major omission because they are 
devoid of any concerted attempt on the part of U.S. corporations to prepare themselves to 
avail of the highly cost-effective means of achieving greenhouse gas emission reduction 
credits offered by investing in the developing world.  As I explain below, I believe this 
omission is short-sighted.
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My article starts from two premises.  First,   those mandatory controls on emissions will 
include the possibility of meeting the requirements of such controls by investing in 
energy efficient projects in developing countries which result in the reduction of 
emissions in those countries.  (This is sanctioned under the Kyoto Protocol).  My second 
starting premise is that achieving credit for the emission reductions that result from such 
investments will be a far less expensive means of meeting the obligations of mandatory 
controls than achieving such reductions by investments within the United States (as 
numerous assessments show).  I argue that, in addition to the preparatory steps they are 
already taking, U.S. corporations should jointly create a new business enterprise, a U.S. 
corporate carbon fund that would fund environmentally friendly projects, or components 
of projects, and, therefore, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, in the developing 
world. 
The enterprise I propose would be a trust fund capitalized by participating corporations 
and administered by the World Bank as trustee.  It would be modeled on the Prototype 
Carbon Fund that was formed by the World Bank in 1999.  The purpose of the fund 
would be to provide financing for projects in less developed countries to be used to cover 
the costs of making those projects more  environmentally friendly than they would 
otherwise be (for example, the fund could finance the additional cost of fitting a scrubber 
to a coal-fired plant).  In return, the fund would receive credits for the reduction in the 
plant’s carbon emissions brought about by the Fund’s financing (in the example above, 
by the use of that scrubber).  The trustee would distribute those credits (a/k/a 
“reductions”) pro rata amongst the participants in the fund, in accordance with their 
S. SMYTH 09.22.05
5
respective contributions.  The participants, in turn, would use those reductions towards 
defrayment of their obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emission that will be imposed 
upon them upon the introduction of mandatory controls.
A U.S. corporate carbon fund would integrate environmental and business principles to 
address everyone’s interest in clean air.  The approach serves three specific business 
objectives.  First, it would position U.S. corporations to prepare for mandatory 
greenhouse gas emission controls; everyone will have to reduce their emissions but the 
advantage will go to those corporations who achieve their reductions in the most cost-
effective manner.  Secondly, it would provide U.S. corporations with exposure to, and 
knowledge of, developing countries’ needs for environmentally friendly technology.  
Thirdly, it would enable U.S. corporations to achieve the goal of corporate social 
responsibility by performing a positive role in addressing the problem of global warming.  
Moreover, by acting together through a fund, U.S. corporations would share the risks of 
project failure and collectively avail of the experience, ties and leverage with the 
developing world that acting through an international financial institution, such as the 
World Bank, can provide. 
More broadly, the fund approach would render significant benefits to the developing 
world and serve as a useful precedent for other public-private sector interventions in 
international development aid.  Such a precedent would be especially useful in light of 
increasing pressure on all developed country governments, including the United States, to 
expand their aid to developing countries and growing recognition on the part of such 
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governments that the private sector will need to play a role in responding to such 
pressures.3
The formation of such a fund will entail a novel integration of disparate legal principles 
that will prove challenging.  Because our scientific understanding of global warming is 
changing, environmental law has had to remain dynamic.  While not stagnant, corporate 
finance, trusts and securities law cover activities that are more settled and, hence, rather 
more resistant to change.  Finally, the involvement of the private sector in a jointly-
managed collaborative effort with the World Bank to target the provision of international 
development aid would raise unresolved issues concerning the boundaries of their 
respective domains.   As the article illustrates, forging an alliance between these disparate 
areas of the law will involve pioneering the development of the law in all three of these 
areas.  I contend that these areas of the law need to evolve and expand to integrate the 
new forms of rights and interests that mandatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions 
will entail and to address the pressing policy concerns that underpin this new regime.
Part 1 of the article examines the state of affairs leading to the imminence of mandatory 
U.S. controls on greenhouse gas emissions, in order to show the form they may take and, 
hence, the issues to which U.S. corporations will have to respond.  It begins with a 
discussion of global warming, the emergence of an international regulatory regime to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions and the current status of federal, state and municipal 
3 See generally, Jeffrey D. Sachs, THE END OF POVERTY (2005) and James D. Wolfensohn, The Challenges 
of Globalization: The Role of the World Bank. Address to the Bundestag, Berlin, Germany (April 2, 2001) 
(stating that development will only endure if it is comprehensive, long-term, and involve the participation 
of all sectors, including the private sector). 
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regulatory measures being undertaken in the United States.  The article argues that, given 
the inefficiencies of either a purely governmental or market intervention, any U.S. 
mandatory controls should be modeled on the hybrid approach introduced under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  In particular, such controls should permit U.S. corporations to meet part 
of their obligations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by investing in emissions 
reduction or preventive projects in developing countries.
Part 2 shows why a U.S. corporate carbon fund would be an effective means of preparing 
U.S. corporations to respond to mandatory controls and to avail of markets for new 
environmentally-friendly technologies.   This part explains the elements of the Prototype 
Carbon Fund, on which I maintain a U.S. corporate carbon fund should be modeled, 
current voluntary measures being undertaken by U.S. corporations to monitor and limit 
their greenhouse gas emissions and how a U.S. corporate carbon fund would build upon 
and expand those efforts.
Part 3 analyzes the legal issues that forming a U.S. corporate carbon fund would present.  
It describes how the highly idiosyncratic governance structure required for such a fund 
would push the envelope of current principles of trust law and corporate governance.  
Further, it takes the nascent step of describing how the new property and other rights and 
interests implicit in mandatory controls would intersect with existing securities and tax 
law.
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In conclusion, I maintain that a U.S. corporate carbon fund would more closely resemble 
an inter-faith union than a shot-gun marriage.  It will involve forging an alliance between 
two very different credos; securities, trust and corporate finance on the one hand, and 
environmental principles on the other.   But the fund would be a voluntary union, and 
many stand to benefit from its progeny; business, the environment and the developing 
world.  
Part I
The Regulation of Global Warming
A. Global Warming Defined
Greenhouse gases are gases that trap heat in the stratosphere.4  While a certain amount of 
greenhouse gases naturally balance the earth’s temperature and create the temperature 
hospitable to life on the planet, when excessive amounts of greenhouse gases become 
trapped in the atmosphere, the heat they generate gives rise to the warming effect 
commonly known as global warming.   Certain human activities, such as the burning of 
fossil fuels produce greenhouse gases.5   The spread of such gases is also advanced by 
activities which denude the earth of natural barriers to the build up of such gases.  The 
destruction of forests, for example, not only releases greenhouse gases through the 
4 For more information on climate change, see the Pew Center on Global Climate Change website, at 
http://www.pewclimate.org. (last visited September 19, 2005).
5
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 4, 1992, art. 1(5), 1771 UNTS 107, 31 
I.L.M 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC];Global Warming Basics, Basic Science, available at
http://pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/basic_science/ (last visited August 3, 2005); 
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burning or decomposition of trees but also contributes to the build up of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere by removing a natural mechanism for the absorption of carbon dioxide, 
the most ubiquitous greenhouse gas.6 The effects of global warming are felt worldwide 
and include, for example, rises in the sea level, with serious consequences for low-lying 
areas and island states; an increase in the range of tropical diseases, such as malaria and 
dengue fever; and marked changes in rainfall, resulting in increased desertification.7
Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydro fluorocarbons, per fluorocarbons, and 
sulphur hexafluoride are the six primary man-made greenhouse gases and these are now 
subject to governmental regulation at the international level and in some national and 
sub-national jurisdictions.8
B. The International Regulatory Response to Global Warming
The legal regulation of global warming occurs on an international and a national level.  
As a global problem, global warming must, necessarily be addressed by sovereign states, 
cooperating together under the rubric of an international convention9.  As a problem 
which is caused in large part, however, by the activities of private actors within those 
states, any effort to address it must also include state action at a domestic level designed 
to regulate the activities of those actors within their borders.  This multi-tiered assault on 
6 Id.
7 Id.
8
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, Annex 
A, 37 I.L.M 22 [hereinafter “Kyoto Protocol”]; Available at http://unfccc.int/cop4/kp.html (last visited 
August 3, 2005)
9 See generally ROGER SCRUTON, THE NEED FOR NATIONS (CIVITAS 2004)
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global warming has taken time to evolve to the level of mandatory international and 
national controls.
(i)  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter the 
“UNFCCC” or the “Convention”),10 which was concluded in New York on May 9, 1992, 
was the first international legal instrument to address global warming.11  The basic 
objective of the UNFCCC is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that accumulate in the 
atmosphere and cause warming beyond the natural greenhouse effect that is essential for 
life on earth.12  The goal of the Convention, therefore, as set out in Article 2, is not to 
eliminate greenhouse gas emissions, but, rather to stabilize them “at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.13  Article 2 further 
provides that such stabilization should be achieved “within a timeframe sufficient to 
allow eco-systems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is 
not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.”14
10 See The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), U.N. Doc. Distr. 
General A/AC. 237/18 Part II/Add. 1.15 (May 1992). Also available at http://unfccc.int/cop4/conv.html
(last visited August 3, 2005). 
11
 The UNFCCC was opened for signature in June 1992 as a part of the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  It came into force on March 21, 1994 and now has 
193 Parties.
12 See Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading, 
17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 267 n.1 (2004).
13 DAVID FREESTONE & CHARLOTTE STRECK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
MECHANISMS : MAKING KYOTO WORK 4-5 (2005).
14
 UNFCCC, supra note 10, art 2.
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The UNFCCC created a framework within which signatories could work towards 
defining a regime for stabilizing worldwide concentrations of greenhouse gases.  As part 
of that framework, the UNFCCC divides the Parties into three categories: (1) all Parties; 
(2) all industrialized country Parties (Annex 1 countries); and (3) all industrialized 
country Parties except those from the former Soviet bloc in a process of economic 
transition (“EIT countries”) (Annex 2 countries).  The UNFCCC requires differing 
commitments from each category of Parties.15
All commitments of the Parties to the UNFCCC were largely hortatory in nature; no firm 
obligations, modalities or benchmarks for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
were specified.16  All Annex 1 countries, however, undertook to adopt national policies 
and measures to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.17  Further, the Convention 
established an institutional apparatus, with the Conference of the Parties (the “Conference 
of the Parties” or “COP”) as its “supreme body” to monitor and review the Convention’s 
implementation.18  The Conference of the Parties initiated the negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC (hereinafter the “Kyoto Protocol” or the “Protocol”), to 
establish concrete obligations pursuant to the Convention, agreed to at the third meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP3), held in Kyoto on December 11, 1997.19
(ii) The Kyoto Protocol
15
 UNFCCC, supra note 10, arts. 2 & 10.
16 FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 5.
17
 UNFCCC, supra note 10, Annex 1.
18
 UNFCCC, supra note 10, Art. 7.
19 The Negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol and its Rulebook, available at
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. (last visited August 3, 2005). 
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The Protocol established a timetable and firm targets by which Parties ratifying the 
Protocol must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.  Under the Protocol, all Annex 1 
countries agreed to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases by an average of 5% 
below their 1990 levels over a five-year commitment period, between 2008 and 2012.20
For countries agreeing to make these reductions, delivering on those agreements means 
passing national legislation imposing mandatory controls on greenhouse gas emitting 
entities within their respective jurisdictions.   Thus, a country’s obligation to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions is passed on, through national legislation, to the pertinent 
private sector actors under its control.
A key tension in introducing mandatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions, whether 
on an international or a national level, is the need to balance between achieving 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions on the one hand and avoiding over-burdening 
greenhouse gas emitting activities on the other to a point where the impact on the 
emitter’s economy, or profits, as the case, may be would be unreasonably harmful. The 
framers of the Protocol aimed to strike this balance by including in the Protocol four 
mechanisms (the “Market Mechanisms”) which give the Parties a variety of options to 
employ in achieving their required reductions.  Further, in recognition of the fact that 
Parties ratifying the Protocol would pass on their obligations to greenhouse gas emitting
20
 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3 (this commitment period is expected to be followed by subsequent 
commitment periods and revised targets).  See also FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 10-11. 
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entities within their domain, such entities are also permitted to avail of the Market 
Mechanisms.21
The mechanisms are the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JI) provided for in Article 6 
of the Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provided for in Article 12, 
the Emissions Trading Mechanism provided for in Article 17 and the Economic 
Organization Bubble (the “EO Bubble”) provided for in Article 4.22  The common thread 
underlying all four mechanisms is that they allow a country (and, therefore, a greenhouse 
gas emitting entity in that country) to achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions by a 
means other than requiring that country or entity to alter its own operations.  The 
rationale for allowing Parties to achieve their targets by utilizing the Market Mechanisms 
is that because global warming is a global problem, any reduction of greenhouse gases, 
wherever it occurs, contributes to the resolution of the problem.23 In addition, the 
flexibility provided by the Market Mechanisms allows for the use of the least-cost 
avenues to reduce emissions, thereby enabling more cost-effective and rapid fulfillment 
of the Protocol’s requirements.  The JI and CDM Mechanisms are the mechanisms which 
are pertinent to the proposal for a U.S. corporate carbon fund because they are the two 
mechanisms which allow an entity to obtain emission reductions through investing in 
projects in an EIT country or a developing country, as such a fund would do.24
21 Although the language of Article 6 of the Protocol, which creates one of the Market Mechanisms, is 
framed in terms of Party-to-Party transactions, it has been interpreted to allow private sector entities to 
avail of such mechanism. Freestone & Streck at 12. 
22
 UNFCCC, supra note 10, Arts. 4, 6, 12 & 17.
23 FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 11.
24 Unlike the JI and CDM mechanisms, the Emissions Trading and EO Bubble Mechanisms are not 
project-based.    See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3, Annex B.  The Emissions Trading Mechanism 
provides for the trading of (i) “Assigned Amounts” of each Party (defined under the Protocol as the 
quantity of greenhouse gases a Party is allowed to release into the global atmosphere, as calculated on a 
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Under the JI Mechanism, any Annex 1 country may transfer to, or acquire from, another 
Annex 1 country, reductions of greenhouse gas emissions, described under Article 6 of 
the Protocol as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), achieved by project activities.25  The 
key feature of this mechanism is that all the emission reductions need to be generated by 
an entity in one Annex 1 country investing in a specific project that reduces emissions in 
another Annex 1 country.26
Under the Article 12 CDM mechanism, Annex 1 countries can invest in projects giving 
rise to emission reductions in non-Annex 1 countries, i.e. developing countries (none of 
which have obligations under the Protocol to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions).  In 
order to ensure that Annex 1 countries and entities therein are only permitted to claim 
credit for those projects in developing countries which demonstrably reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, Article 12 provides for the establishment of a supervisory structure, the 
Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board, which includes an emissions reduction 
yearly basis), Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8,art. 17, (ii) parts of Assigned Amounts, (iii) Certified Emission 
Reductions and (iv) Emission Reduction Units amongst Annex 1 countries.  Id.   The EO Bubble 
Mechanism, allows a regional economic integration organization which is a Party to the Protocol (such as 
the European Union (the “EU”)) to adopt an EO-wide target or “bubble” which can then be apportioned 
amongst EO members in any manner the members choose. Id. art. 4.  The EU has taken advantage of the 
EO Bubble Mechanism and has established an EU Emissions Trading Scheme, by which EU member states 
have each been given an overall emissions target and may trade EU Allowances (as defined by EU law) to 
meet their obligations. FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at [  ].
25
 These ERUs may be generated by any projects that reduce anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
or which enhance the anthropogenic removal of such gases by sinks (which are any processes, activities, or 
mechanisms, which remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere).
26
 It is also subject to a number of further requirements.  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 6.  Projects 
require approval of both the state parties acting as transferor and transferee, both of whom must be parties 
to the Protocol.  Id. Further, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that take place as a result of the 
project must be additional to any that would otherwise have occurred (“additionality” is established by a 
“but for” test; but for the project the a particular benefit  would not have happened).  Id.  No state can 
acquire ERUs if it is not itself in compliance with certain other requirements of the Protocol. Id.  Finally, 
the acquisition of such ERUs cannot be a substitute for domestic action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
but, rather, must be supplemental to domestic actions.   Id.
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verification and certification system.  Emission reductions certified through this system 
are termed Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) to distinguish them from ERUs, the 
product of Article 6 JI projects.27  The Conference of the Parties has overarching 
responsibility for elaborating modalities and procedures for the operation of the CDM.
The Market Mechanisms are all required under the Protocol to be supplementary to 
domestic action on the part of the Parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in their 
territories.28  However, they make the concrete obligations of the Protocol more palatable 
to the Parties and entities affected by the Protocol’s obligations because they allow for 
the identification and use of the least costly measures to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.   In the case of JI and CDM projects, there is a drastic difference in the cost of 
achieving greenhouse gas emission reductions by investing in a project in an EIT county 
or developing country, and the cost that would be incurred in achieving greenhouse gas 
emission reductions by retrofitting an existing operation or initiating a new project in a 
developed country.29  In some cases, it is by one or two orders of magnitude cheaper to 
27
 In a number of respects, however, CDM projects resemble JI projects.  For example, projects must 
manifest real, measurable and long-term benefits relating to mitigation of climate change; and a project 
activity generating CERs must be “additional” to that which would have occurred in its absence.  See
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 12(5)(c).
28 FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 272.
29 FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 11 (The theory behind the approach that emission reductions 
financed in other countries might be set off against the financier’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
targets is that the “marginal abatement cost”, i.e. the cost of financing an emission reduction, will usually 
be far higher in a relatively fuel efficient industrialized country than in an EIT country or a developing 
country which may have less efficient fuel-use technology.  As the global climate system benefits from 
reductions wherever they are made, then making reductions in an EIT or a developing country as part of a 
national strategy (which also includes the introduction of  domestic policies and measures to reduce 
emissions at home) will make the cost of reaching these reduction targets cheaper and increase the chances 
that they will actually be reached).   See also A.D. Ellerman & A. Decaux, Sloan School of Management 
and Mass. Inst. of Tech., Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using Marginal Abatement 
Curves (1998), available at
http://web.mit.edu/afs/athena.mit.edu/org/g/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt40.pdf (last visited Apr. 
15, 2005).
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achieve a ton of greenhouse gas emission reductions in an EIT country or a developing 
country than to achieve such reductions in a developed country (Japan being the most 
costly country of all for these purposes).30
 The Kyoto Protocol went into effect on February 16, 2005.  To enter into force, it 
required ratification by fifty five Parties to the UNFCCC, including ratification by Annex 
I parties “which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide 
emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex 1.”31  Its effectiveness was delayed 
initially by heated and protracted negotiations between the Parties over the details of the 
Market Mechanisms32 and subsequently by the abrupt, and unexpected withdrawal by the 
United States of its support for the Protocol, following the ascension of the Bush 
Administration in the 2000 U.S. election.33
30See A.D. Ellerman & A. Decaux, Sloan School of Management and Mass. Inst. of Tech., Analysis of 
Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using Marginal Abatement Curves (1998), supra n. 29
31
 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 25(1).  
32 FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 8; DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN, & DURWOOD ZAELKE, 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 639 (2d ed. 2002).  At the fourth meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP4), held in Buenos Aires in November 1998, the Parties agreed that the 
deadline for reaching decision on the  Mechanisms would be the sixth meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP6), scheduled to be held in The Hague in November 2000.  Id.  In fact, the Hague meeting was 
a failure.  FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 8; The Parties encountered several roadblocks in their 
efforts to reach agreement on the modalities of the Market Mechanisms (such as, for example, the role that 
sink projects should play in Parties discharge of  their obligations under the Protocol).  Id  Moreover, the 
meeting was shrouded by the shadow of the uncertainty cast by the then- recent US election, the result of 
which was still the subject of controversy at the time of the Hague meeting.  The US delegation went to the 
Hague not knowing whether Al Gore or George W. Bush would be the next President.  Hunter, Salzman & 
Zaelke at 639.  After the Hague meeting, an extra session of the COP was scheduled for July, 2001 in an 
effort to move things forward. Prior to that scheduled extra session, however, the Republicans ousted the 
Democrats in the 2000 US elections.
33
 Bryner, supra note 12, at 273.  The result of the U.S. decision not to ratify the Protocol was that virtually 
all the other Annex 1 Parties, including the Russian Federation, would have to ratify the Protocol in order 
to bring it into force. Paradoxically, the U.S. action galvanized the remaining Parties to put aside their 
differences and at the seventh meeting of the COP, held in Marrakesh in November 2001, the Parties finally 
agreed upon a framework of guidelines, modalities and rules for implementing the Market Mechanisms.
The Protocol subsequently entered into force when the Russian Federation ratified it on February 16 of this 
year.  FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 9; 
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C.  The U.S. Regulatory Response to Global Warming 
At the same time that President Bush announced that his Administration was withdrawing 
from the Kyoto Protocol, he promised to provide his own plan for reducing the threat of 
global warming34 and efforts to address global warming have been ongoing on a number 
of different levels ever since.  Consequently, U.S. corporations and other entities which 
emit greenhouse gases are faced today with the prospect of federal legislation imposing 
mandatory reductions and a myriad web of evolving state and city- wide controls.  At the 
federal level, Congress has considered a plethora of legislative proposals aimed at 
introducing greenhouse gas emissions reductions programs35 while at a non-federal level, 
states and cities have taken a variety of proactive steps.36
(i) Federal Initiatives
Shortly after announcing the withdrawal from Kyoto, the Bush Administration proposed 
to revamp the federal reporting requirement for carbon dioxide emissions, proposed $4.6 
billion in tax credits over five years as an incentive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and set a goal of reducing the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy through voluntary 
measures.37  This proposal never advanced but it was followed by a series of other 
legislative proposals aimed at introducing emission reductions programs.38
34 See Bryner, supra note 12, citing Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Plans Expected to Slow, Not Halt, Gas 
Emissions Rise, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2001 at A1.
35 See Bryner, supra note 12, at 274-275. 
36See generally, US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, US CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 61 (2002) [hereinafter US 
CLIMATE ACTION REPORT], for examples of state and local initiatives. 
37 Id. at 64.
38
 Since President Bush proposed his environmental plans, Congress has taken the lead in introducing 
legislation.  In the Senate, Senators McCain and Brownback introduced legislation in December 2001 to 
establish a national emissions registry and to establish credits from voluntary programs that could be used 
in any eventual mandatory emission reduction program.  The following year, Senator Jim Jeffords 
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The most recent proposal is the “Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005,” 
which was introduced in the Senate on May 26, 2005 and is currently under review by the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.39  The bill provides for the 
imposition of mandatory greenhouse gas emission reductions and for the establishment of 
an emissions registry, an emissions trading program and a climate research program.40
The creation of a market-driven reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through the use of 
tradable emissions allowances is a key objective of the bill.41  Under the bill, the 
government would first distribute emissions allowances equal in number to an entity’s 
emissions limit for a given year.42  Starting in 2010, greenhouse gas emitting entities 
covered by the bill would then be required to submit to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) one such allowance for each ton of carbon dioxide, or the 
carbon dioxide equivalent of other greenhouse gases, it emits after introduction of the 
allowance program.43  Such allowances could be bought and sold freely by anyone and 
allowances unused at the end of a year could be banked for use in a future year.  The bill 
permits an entity to satisfy up to 15% of its total allowance submission requirement by 
sponsored the Clean Power Act of 2002 that would have required power plants to reduce carbon dioxide by 
twenty-three percent and other emissions from current levels by 2008.   Subsequently, Senator McCain and 
Lieberman introduced a greenhouse gas cap and trade bill that would have required sources to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2010 to year 2000 levels and by 20016 to 1990 levels.  Lastly, not to be 
outdone by the Senate, the House of Representatives introduced an energy bill that would impose 
mandatory controls on carbon dioxide emissions if sixty percent of American companies do not register 
voluntary reductions with the federal government during the next five years.  None of these bills received 
the necessary votes to become enacted.  See Bryner supra note 12, at 273-275.  However, despite the lack 
of success, they gained progressive support as the McCain-Lieberman narrowly lost by a vote of fifty-five 
to forty three. 
39
 S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.1151:.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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submitting tradable allowances from another country’s market in greenhouse gas 
emissions, provided such other national market meets certain qualifications.44
(ii) Non-Federal Initiatives
Individual states have undertaken several different kinds of measures.  Significantly, 
twenty eight states have completed comprehensive climate action plans which detail steps 
that the states can take to reduce their contributions to global warming.45  Further, many 
states have established voluntary greenhouse gas emission registries.46  Some states have 
introduced caps or offset requirements on emissions from fossil fuel power plants.47
Other states have enacted legislation to curb greenhouse gas emissions resulting from 
transportation and/or agriculture and several states require that electric utilities generate a 
specified amount of electricity from renewable energy sources.48  Twenty three states 
have established Public Benefit Funds to support energy efficiency and renewable energy 
projects.49  In addition, eleven states in the Northeastern and mid-Atlantic region have 
launched a multi-state initiative50 to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, with the objective 
of developing a regional strategy for controlling emissions.51
44 Id.  The US Secretary for the Environment must have determined that such other country’s system for 
trading in greenhouse gas emissions is complete, accurate and transparent and such other nation must have 
adopted enforceable limits on its greenhouse gas emissions which the tradable allowances were issued to 
implement.  Id.  Further, the entity seeking to use such allowances must certify that the allowances have 
been retired, unused, in the other country’s market.  Id.
45See US CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 36.  For example, Massachusetts has imposed a cap on 
emissions from fossil fuel power plants at approximately 10% below 1997-99 levels, to be achieved 
between 2006 and 2008.  Further, Washington requires new power plants to offset approximately 20% of 
anticipated carbon emissions.   Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49Such funds are funded by assessing a charge on electricity customers’ utility bills or by requiring 
specified contributions from utilities.  Id.
50
 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, see www.rggi.org/stakeholder_member.htm (last visited August 
4, 2005); See also Dan Worth, Accelerating Towards Climate Neutrality With The U.S. Government Stuck 
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An increasing number of municipalities are committing to serious emission reductions 
that meet, and in some cases, surpass the targets set in the Kyoto Protocol.52  On June 13, 
2005, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, representing 1,183 cities, voted unanimously to 
support the Climate Protection Agreement sponsored by Seattle Mayor, Greg Nickels.53
This agreement adopts as its goal the achievement of the same level of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions as would be required of the U.S. were it to ratify the Kyoto Protocol; 
specifically to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 7% below their 1990 levels by 
2012.  In adopting this agreement, mayors committed that their cities would aim to meet 
this goal and urged the state and federal governments to adopt policies establishing a 
similar target.54
iii. Incorporation of Kyoto-style Project-based Mechanisms 
As indicated above, to date, efforts in the U.S. to regulate greenhouse gas emissions have 
focused primarily on creating an infrastructure for measuring and recording emissions 
reductions, testing various forms of mandatory controls and developing a system to cap 
and trade greenhouse gas emissions. As the adoption of mandatory controls becomes 
in Neutral: The Emerging Role of U.S. Businesses, Cities, States, and Universities in Aggressively 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions.  5 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY 4, 4-8 (Spring 
2005).
51 Id.  The plan, which focuses on limiting emissions from electric power generators, includes a cap-and-
trade program with a market-based emission trading system.
52
 Worth, supra note 50, at 6.
53 See Worth, supra note 50, n.47 (citing Seattle dreams of “green” team: Mayor urging other US cities to 
enact Kyoto Protocol, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 17, 2005, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/212425_kyoto17.html?search-pagefrom=1&searchdiff=59 (last visited 
August 4, 2005).
54 Id.
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increasingly imminent, however, it will be vital for increased attention to be paid to the 
issue of how new emission reductions can be generated.  
If, instead of continuing to pursue its own plan, the U.S. goes ahead and ratifies the 
Kyoto Protocol, any federal legislation to regulate greenhouse gas emissions would most 
likely track the rules established by the Protocol.  Accordingly, it would be highly likely 
that any cap and trade framework introduced by such legislation would allow for 
recognition of emission reductions generated pursuant to the Protocol’s Market 
Mechanisms.   If, however, as seems increasingly likely, the U.S. does not ratify the 
Protocol but formalizes its own plan,55 then there is every reason to expect (and for U.S. 
entities to urge) that such a plan should include a process that permits U.S. entities to 
achieve emission reduction credits that can be used to meet at least a portion of their 
obligations through mechanisms that are similar to the Protocol’s project-based 
mechanisms (the JI and CDM Mechanisms).  The U.S.’ objections to the Protocol do not 
center on the Market Mechanisms’ inclusion in the Protocol.56  To the contrary, the tools 
of the Protocol borrow from a mechanism created by the U.S. in the early 1990’s to deal 
with the problem of acid rain.57  Moreover, excluding similar mechanisms would 
55 See Press Release, The White House, President and Danish Minister Rasmussen Discuss G8, Africa (July 
6, 2005) (advancing an alternative plan to Kyoto where the United States and the world can work together 
to share technologies and control greenhouse gases as best as possible without destroying the United States’ 
economy).
56 Some key objections to the Protocol include: criticisms that the Protocol is ineffective in addressing 
climate change because it does not include developing countries; the potential for economic harm to United 
States and global economies; and the fear that the Protocol will subvert US sovereignty, leaving the US 
dependent on other countries to meet its emissions targets.  See David A. Wirth, Current Development:  
The Sixth Session (Part Two) and Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 96 A.J.I.L. 648, 657 (2002).   
57 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 
Yale L.J. 677, 765-66 (1999) (noting the assignment of extra tradeable allowances to Midwestern electric 
utilities as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act).
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needlessly deprive the U.S., U.S. entities and the developing world of the opportunity to 
pursue the kind of win/win collaborations that such mechanisms allow.  
As discussed in Part II below, the Prototype Carbon Fund and the additional carbon funds 
formed in its wake pave the way for the effective use of project-based mechanisms like 
the JI and CDM Mechanisms.  Given the probable inclusion of similar mechanisms in the 
U.S. system of mandatory controls that is ultimately adopted, a U.S. corporate fund, 
modeled on those funds would give U.S. entities a valuable head start.
Part II
A U.S. Corporate Carbon Trust Fund as a New Voluntary Venture
The Prototype Carbon Fund was established by a group of participants who found 
themselves in a situation very similar to that faced by US corporations and other entities 
today.  Long before the Kyoto Protocol came into force, Parties, and entities likely to be 
affected there under, were interested in taking measures to prepare themselves for the 
implementation of the Protocol’s provisions.  From the time when it was negotiated, it 
was clear that the Protocol would spawn a new universe of obligations and opportunities 
once it went into effect.  Mandatory controls on the emission of greenhouse gases were 
going to become part of the landscape and the most cost-effective way of complying with 
them was going to involve the use of the Market Mechanisms.  Thus, Parties and likely-
affected entities began exploring possibilities for positioning themselves to prepare to 
meet their obligations and, in particular, to use the Market Mechanisms, in preparation 
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for the Protocol’s entry into force.58  The Prototype Carbon Fund grew out of such 
preparations.
A. The Role and Purpose of the Prototype Carbon Fund
The governmental and corporate participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund, together with 
the World Bank, created the fund to pioneer implementation of the Protocol’s project-
based mechanism, the JI and CDM Mechanisms.59  The enormous potential these 
mechanisms offered to create win/win collaborations between the public and private 
sector in the developed world, on the one hand, and EIT countries and developing 
countries, on the other, prompted immediate interest.  Thus, these mechanisms gave rise 
to a pool of government and private sector entities on the lookout for opportunities to 
invest in projects in developing and EIT countries that would provide a cost-effective 
means of generating emission reduction credits.   These individual companies and 
governments were not ideally placed to negotiate one on one with developing countries 
and EIT countries the mechanics of individual JI and CDM projects.  The transaction 
costs and risks created barriers potentially significant enough to render the Market 
Mechanisms impractical and irrelevant. By proceeding in concert, however, as co-
participants in a joint fund with the World Bank serving as intermediary between the 
developed and the developing world as trustee, the transaction costs and investment risks 
58 See Bryner, supra note 10, at 279-286 (noting that the Canadian, Danish, Dutch, and British governments 
launched national policies to begin to bring them into compliance with the Protocol’s provisions).
59
 Prototype Carbon Fund Legal Instrument, [hereinafter “PCF Instrument”]; available at
http://carbonfinance.org/pcf/Router.cfm?Page=DocLib&Dtype=25&ActionType=ListItems (last visited 
August 4, 2005).
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could be reduced significantly.  Ultimately, fifteen corporations and six governments 
joined as participants  in the Prototype Carbon Fund.60
The role of the Prototype Carbon Fund, therefore, was to serve as a central fund, 
managed by the World Bank as trustee that would finance JI and CDM projects.  The 
idea was that the World Bank, with its extensive ties to the developing world and 
experience in dealing with projects there, would be the ideal honest broker between that 
world and the participants.61  For its part, the World Bank was interested in serving as 
trustee of the fund because of the huge potential JI and CDM projects offered to increase 
investment in developing countries and EIT countries, and to effect the transfer of 
environmentally friendly technology to such countries on an unprecedented scale, two 
objectives which lie at the heart of the World Bank’s mandate.62
The basic concept of the Prototype Carbon Fund, and the eight funds that have been 
formed in its wake, is remarkably simple.63  The World Bank, as trustee, collects funds 
from the public and private sector participants and uses the pooled funds to purchase the 
greenhouse gas emission reductions generated by energy and/or forestry projects in 
60
 The six governments are Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, and Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation; and the fifteen companies who participated in the first closing of the Fund were, 
British Petroleum-Amoco, Chubu Electric Power Co., Chugoku Electric Power Co., Deutsche Bank, 
Electrabel/Suez-Lyonaise des Eaux, Gaz de France, Norsk Hydro, R.W.E., Statoil, and eight Japanese 
companies, including Chubu Electric Power Co., Chugoku Electric Power Co., Kyushu Electric Power Co., 
Shikowu Power Co., Tohoku Electric Power Co., Tokyo Electric Power Co, Mitsubishi Corp., and Mitsui.  
The initial US$150 million cap on the Fund was raised in May 2000, see Res. 2000-1, Bank Minutes and 
International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) Minutes, Meeting of the Exec. Dirs. of the Bank and IDA and 
the Directors of IFC (May 23, 2000).  A second closing took place on October 31, 2000, and two additional 
private sector participants, Fortnum and Rabobank joined at that time.  The fund is now closed.
61 FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 281.
62
 Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development .
63 FREESTONE & STRECK, supra note 13, at 17-18.  
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developing countries and EIT countries.64   In return for the payment for the emission 
reductions, the project entities transfer to the World Bank, acting as trustee of the fund, 
the emission reductions generated by the project.  The World Bank, as trustee, then 
distributes such emission reductions pro rata to the fund’s participants in proportion to 
the size of their contributions to the fund.  Fund participants can then use the emission 
reductions so obtained towards satisfaction of their own obligations, whether under the 
Protocol or pursuant to domestic regulations introduced as a result of the Protocol, to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.65
B.   The Prototype Carbon Fund as a Precedent for a U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund
 The position of U.S. corporations today, facing the probability of the “necessary” and 
“inevitable” mandatory controls on the emission of greenhouse gases, predicted by 
Immelt, is reminiscent of the position of the parties who participated in the Prototype 
Carbon Fund in 1999.  Like the participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund, U.S. 
corporations have been exploring ways to prepare for mandatory greenhouse gas 
emissions controls.  
(i)  Current U.S. Corporate Voluntary Measures
64 Id.  The carbon dioxide-equivalent emission reductions so purchased are created in many ways.  An 
example of a project that would generate such emission reductions would be a  wind power project that is 
either more costly than a project that would ordinarily be added into the local energy grid, such as coal or 
natural gas, or has more barriers than a coal or natural gas project.  Over its lifetime, the wind power 
project will generate the number of tons of carbon-dioxide-equivalent reductions that would have been 
generated by the coal or gas project.
65See David Freestone, The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund: Mobilizing New Resources for 
Sustainable Development, New York: Kluwer Law International 282.
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Over the last several years, U.S. corporations have taken several proactive steps to 
prepare for mandatory controls.  Such steps have been primarily directed at building 
capacity and systems to track their greenhouse gas emissions, initiating efforts to reduce 
their emissions and experimenting with systems for trading reductions.  The most 
extensive of these efforts include the Chicago Climate Exchange, Climate Leaders, the 
Business Environmental Leadership Council and the Oregon Climate Trust, and a number 
of other inter and intra corporate trading programs.66
The Chicago Climate Exchange (the “Exchange”) is a pilot greenhouse gas emission 
reductions and trading program.67  Its members include eighty one corporations, 
municipalities and other entities that emit greenhouse gases from facilities in the United 
States, Canada or Mexico.68  All members have committed to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by 4% below the average of their 1998-2001 emissions by 2006.69  The 
Exchange issues an emissions allowance to each member in accordance with an emission 
baseline and emission reduction schedule agreed with each member.70  Emission 
reductions eligible for the program include emission reductions earned through investing 
in projects undertaken in the United States, Canada and Mexico which offset greenhouse 
gas emissions, such as, for example, landfill methane or agricultural methane destruction 
projects and projects to renew forests.71 The Exchange maintains a registry in which 
eligible projects are recorded and the Exchange issues emission reductions credits to 
66
 For an exhaustive description of  these initiatives, see Bryner, supra note 12.
67
 Chicago Climate Exchange, available at http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/ (last visited August 4, 2005).
68 Id.  Its members include, for example, Ford Motor Company, Dupont and Amtrak. 
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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members on the basis of realized mitigation tonnage.72  Members can trade such credits 
amongst themselves.73
The Business Environmental Leadership Council is a group of thirty nine U.S. 
corporations who have agreed to work individually to reduce their own greenhouse gas 
emissions, by investing in new and more efficient products, practices and technologies, 
and together in support of actions to achieve cost-effective emissions reductions.74
Climate Leaders is a program of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency with some 
thirty seven “Partners”, who are U.S. corporations who have voluntarily agreed to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions by a certain percentage over an agreed timeframe.75
The Oregon Climate Trust is a non-profit organization which receives funding from a 
variety of U.S. businesses and individuals.76  Its purpose is to purchase greenhouse gas 
emission reductions on behalf of corporations, individuals and other entities (which are to 
be verified by a disinterested and qualified third party) and to advocate for the adoption 
of sound climate change policies.77   To date, most of the projects it has financed are 
located in the Northwestern portion of the United States but a small portion of the $4 
million it has provided to finance projects has been used to fund non-U.S. based projects 
(including, for example, a project in Ecuador for the restoration of a rainforest).78
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See US CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 36, at 62.  The Council is supported by the Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change.  Its members include Boeing, Dupont, Sunoco and Toyota, among others.  Id.
75 Id. The coalition includes General Motors Corporation, Johnson & Johnson and Xerox Corporation.  Id.
76
 Chicago Climate Exchange, supra note 67.  
77 Id.
78 Id.
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Many corporations have also undertaken voluntary emission trading programs which 
provide for the trading of emission reductions across divisions of a corporation, and 
externally, with division managers being given incentives to reduce their respective 
divisions’ emissions.79 Emission reductions can be generated by reducing emissions or by 
investing in projects that sequester carbon dioxide.80
(ii) The Role and Purpose of A U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund
The current, ongoing U.S. corporate voluntary initiatives prepare US corporations for 
mandatory controls by creating the infrastructure necessary for such corporations to 
measure and record their greenhouse gas emissions.  Further, the voluntary trading 
programs prepare these companies for potential future regulation and for carbon trading 
on a global level.  What is missing from these initiatives, however, is a more active and 
robust means of preparing US entities to avail themselves of the kind of win/win 
opportunities presented by project-based mechanisms like the JI and CDM 
Mechanisms.81  A U.S. corporate carbon fund modeled along the lines of the Prototype 
79 See Bryner, supra note 12, at 281-286.  These measures have resulted in considerable improvements in 
energy efficiency but, because of the growth in the U.S. economy, total emissions of greenhouse gases 
from U.S. sources, measured as carbon dioxide equivalent, grew by 10.9% between 1990 and 2002.  Id. at 
273.
For example, in 2000, Shell set a target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by twenty five percent by 
the year 2002.  At the beginning of each year, it allocates permits to its business units for each of three 
years based on 98% of its 1998 emissions.  A certain percent of each allocation along with three percent of 
the allocation from 2001 and one percent of the allocation from 2002 are withheld and then auctioned to 
help stimulate a market and help managers determine the most cost-effective mechanism for their unit–
reducing emissions or purchasing credits.  Participation in the program is voluntary and restricted to units 
in developed countries.  Sales take place through a sales manager, who keeps a registry of all transactions 
and ensures that units have the requisite number of permits to cover their emissions at the end of each year; 
is not the unit is fined.  Id. at 282-83.
80 Bryner, supra note 12, at 282-83.
81
 Though project-based emission reduction credits for projects based in Mexico and Ecuador are a feature 
of the Chicago Climate Exchange and Oregon Climate Trust, they are a relatively insignificant part of those 
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Carbon Fund and consisting of a pooled fund to purchase emission reductions from JI and 
CDM projects, would fill this gap.
Such a fund would enable U.S. corporations to pursue the same kind of “learning by 
doing” experienced by the participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund and its progeny.  
U.S. corporations could learn from, and build upon, their foreign counterparts’ 
experience in setting up such a fund.  Such a fund would also give U.S. corporations 
exposure to the needs and demands of developing countries and EIT countries for modern 
environmental technology.  Moreover, it would provide them with opportunities to make 
a positive contribution to the developing world and to EIT countries which would 
enhance their standing as good corporate citizens on the domestic U.S. front.    
The investment of funds and time in such a fund would not be risk-free, just as it was not 
risk- free for those who participated in the Prototype Carbon Fund and its progeny.  For 
all of the participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund, for example, there was a speculative 
aspect to their participation.  There was no guarantee that the Kyoto Protocol would go 
into effect when the fund was created.  Moreover, given that the modalities of the JI and 
CDM Mechanisms were still in the process of being developed when the Fund was 
established, there was no guarantee that any emission reduction credits purchased by the 
Fund would be recognized under those modalities.  Furthermore, the whole process of 
verifying and certifying emission reductions was still at a nascent stage.
initiatives’ activities.  See Chicago Climate Exchange, supra note 67; See also Oregon Climate Trust, 
available at http://www.climatetrust.org (last visited August 3, 2005).
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The participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund and its progeny assumed these risks 
because they knew that the mandatory regulation of emission reductions was a train that 
had left the station and they did not want to get left behind.  From their point of view, the 
sooner they began building knowledge and experience in this area, the better.  Further, 
creating a Fund and participating in it enabled them, as early pioneers of the project-
based mechanisms, to shape the details of how the mechanisms would work in practice. 
Moreover, the fund approach enabled them to share the risks to which these uncertainties 
gave rise. 
Several other advantages also flow from pursuing a fund approach.   Firstly, a portfolio 
approach spreads the risk of total project failure and allows for economies of scale and 
replication of basic transactions.  Secondly, participating in the governance and decision-
making of such a fund allows participants to gain experience in the greenhouse gas 
emission reductions markets and thereby learn by doing.82  Thirdly, the use of an entity 
82
 Over time, the “learning by doing” aspect of the Prototype Carbon Fund has been extremely successful 
and has led to the fund serving as a precedent for several additional funds.  These now include two 
specialized funds and several country-specific funds.  The specialized funds are the Community 
Development Carbon Fund (which funds the purchase of emission reductions from small scale projects that 
improve the welfare of local communities in the poorer areas of the developing world)(participants include 
the governments of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Spain and private 
companies from Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland) and  the 
BioCarbon Fund (which finances projects that sequester or conserve greenhouse gases in forests, agro, and 
other ecosystems (participants include the governments of Canada, Italy, Luxemburg, and Spain, and 
various French and Japanese private companies).  The country-specific funds are funds created by specific 
governments but open to public and private sector participants from the donor country.  They include  the 
Netherlands Clean Development Facility, the Netherlands European Carbon Facility, the Italian Carbon 
Fund, the Danish Carbon Fund and the Spanish Carbon Fund.  These funds are designed to purchase 
emission reductions generated in accordance with the requirements of the JI and CDM Mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol. See Carbon Finance at the World Bank, available at http://carbonfinance.org/ (last viewed 
August 4, 2005).  Together with the Prototype Carbon Fund, these funds account for more than $850 
million in resources managed by the World Bank as trustee.  (See May 11, 2005 World Bank Press Release 
on Carbon Expo, www.carbonfinance.org.).
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such as the World Bank to serve as trustee of the fund avails of the experience, ties and 
leverage such an entity has with the countries hosting the projects being funded.  
These same considerations would apply for potential participants in a U.S. corporate 
carbon fund.  Mandatory controls are very likely to be introduced in the U.S. but there is 
a slight chance that they won’t be.  Moreover, the precise nature of such expected 
controls is not yet known and there would be no guarantee that the emission reductions 
earned by a U.S. corporate fund would be recognized under the U.S. domestic scheme 
that may eventually be established.   However, the reasons and considerations that 
prompted the participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund and its progeny to assume 
similar risks in participating in those funds, apply with equal force to U.S. corporations as 
prospective participants in a U.S. corporate carbon fund.
Part III
A U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund as a New Alliance of Legal Principles 
A Novel Form of Corporate Governance
Recognizing the reasons why forming a carbon fund would advance the interests of the 
global environment, U.S. industry and the developing world, is one thing.  Constructing a 
legal modality to achieve the objectives of such a fund is another.  Forming a U.S. 
corporate carbon fund will involve forging an alliance between three very different 
worlds; the dynamic fast changing world of environmental law; the established, 
mainstream corporate world of corporate finance, trusts and securities law;  and the more 
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nebulous, less known world of international development aid.  Creating such a fund, 
therefore, will not simply pioneer a U.S. project-based mechanism for achieving 
greenhouse gas emission reductions, it will involve the challenge of pioneering 
integration of all three of these worlds.   
That challenge involves devising a corporate governance structure for the fund that 
accomplishes six over-arching objectives.  The fund’s structure, for example, would need 
to provide a means for fund participants to undertake an active and ongoing role in the 
management of such fund.  Such a role would be essential to their gaining front line 
exposure to developing countries’ needs for projects that would produce emission 
reductions and for environmentally friendly technology.  The opportunity to obtain such 
exposure would be a key reason for their participating in such a fund.
Second, and balanced against participants’ need for front line involvement, the fund 
would need a structure that would shield participants from the risk of individual liability 
for the acts and omissions of the fund.  Absent such a shield, one of the key purposes for 
participating in a fund would be lost.  Third, the fund’s structure would need to have a 
procedure for managing the potential conflicts of interest between the participants inter se 
and between the participants and the fund.
Additionally, the fund would have to clarify the scope of the World Bank’s fiduciary 
duties of such a fund.  Such clarification would involve defining the role of the World 
Bank as an intermediary within the unique requirements of the World Bank, deriving 
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from its status as an international development institution under the U.S. International 
Organizations Act.83  As will be shown below, it would be in the interests of both the 
participants and the World Bank to maintain a clear distinction and disentanglement 
between the fund’s operations and the Bank’s lending operations.  Moreover, consistent 
with the growing trend in international development aid to give the recipients of such aid 
a say in the form such aid should take,84 the fund would have to reflect a role for the 
countries hosting fund-financed projects.  Lastly, consistent with its role as a pilot of 
mechanisms and procedures to be adopted in the future, the fund would have to reflect an 
agreed methodology for the administration of a portfolio of emission reductions. 
Accomplishing these objectives will necessitate a marriage of environmental, corporate 
and development aid principles.  An examination of the key features of the Prototype 
Carbon Fund shows why this will be so.85
(i) Shielding Participants from Personal Liability
The governance structure devised for the Prototype Carbon Fund (the “Fund”), as set out 
in the Instrument to Establish the Prototype Carbon Fund (the “Instrument’),86 creates a 
framework within which the participants can voice their opinions in the Fund’s 
83See Definition of “International Organization,” U.S. International Organizations Act.  22 USCS §288 
(2005). 
84 See World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Addressing the Challenges of Globalization: An 
Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Approach to Global Problems, The World Bank, 2004, at 84 
(“the voices of developing countries...are inadequately represented in the international consensus...[there is 
a] need to strengthen the role of developing countries...in global programs.”)      
85
 The Prototype Carbon Fund is the mother of all eight of the other carbon funds for which the World Bank 
acts as trustee; the instruments of those other funds are all modeled on the instrument of the Prototype 
Carbon Fund.  For that reason, the provisions of the instrument of the Prototype Carbon Fund will be used 
as illustrative of the points being made in this article.  Any instances in which the instruments of the other 
funds diverge from those provisions will be cross-referenced where relevant to the point under discussion.
86PCF Instrument, supra note 59.  
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management and operations.    The structure has five component parts: a Fund 
Management Committee, a Fund Management Unit, a Participants’ Meeting, a 
Participants’ Committee, and a Host Country Committee.87  As trustee, the Bank was 
charged with forming the Fund Management Committee88 (which consists of a Fund 
Manager and four other members of Bank Management) to exercise general oversight 
over the Fund.89   Day-to-day responsibility for the Fund’s operations is vested in the 
Fund Management Unit, which is headed by the Fund Manager and consists of a staff of 
technical and operational specialists selected by him.90
The participants’ active and ongoing involvement is achieved through the Participants’ 
Meeting and the Participants Committee.  The Participants’ Meeting is an annual meeting 
of all contributors to the Fund91 and is the vehicle through which participants exercise an 
overview role over the Fund’s operations.   At those meetings, participants review and 
approve the Fund’s annual budget and business plan, provide the Bank with general 
policy advice and strategic guidance, and approve any suggestions for amendments to the 
project selection and project portfolio criteria.92  The participants also have the power to 
terminate the Fund by resolution of a two-thirds majority93 and the power to authorize the 
Bank as trustee to remove a participant in certain circumstances.94
87 Id. at art. VIII, §§ 8.7 and 8.8 & arts. V, VI, and VII. . 
88 Id. at art. VIII, § 8.7.
89 Id.
90Id. at art. VIII, § 8.8. 
91 Id. at art. V, § 5.1
92 Id. at art. V, § 5.1 (a)-(g).
93 Id. at art. XV, § 15.2 (a).
94 Id. at art. IX, § 9.2 (a).
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Participants exercise a hands-on role through their involvement in the Participants’ 
Committee.   It consists of five participants, two drawn from the private sector and three 
drawn from the public sector, who are elected at the Participants’ Meeting and whose 
membership rotates annually.95  The Participants’ Committee does not have to give 
positive approval to every project funded by the Fund; however, it vets every project 
proposal to determine whether to object to the inclusion of the project in the Fund’s 
portfolio.96 It also provides general advice to the Bank on the Fund’s operations.97
(a) Partnership, Corporation or Trust?
Forming a U.S. corporate carbon fund which affords the participants the kinds of powers 
exercised by the participants of the Prototype Carbon Fund, without exposing them to the 
risk of personal liability pushes the envelope of corporate governance and trust law 
principles.   The objective of creating a jointly managed fund, to be managed by the 
partners on their own behalf, could readily be achieved by forming a partnership between 
the participants and contracting with the World Bank to administer the fund as agent for 
such partnership.  An agent undertakes to act on behalf of the principal and subject to the 
latter’s control.98 A partnership, however, would not afford the protection of limited 
liability; the partners to a partnership are jointly and severally liable for the acts or 
95 Id. at art. VI, § 6.1.  However, the instrument provided that the first Participants’ Committee would 
consist of seven members, who would serve from the date of their first (organizational) meeting until the 
second annual Participants’ Meeting.
96Id. at art. VI, § 6.4(c).
97 Id. at art. VI, § 6.4(a).
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY, § 1 (1958)(“an agency is the fiduciary relation which results from 
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other so to act.”)
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omissions of the partnership or the agent thereof99 and cannot limit their liability to the 
extent of their contributions to the partnership.100
Forming a new corporation is always an option when limited liability is sought but, for 
two reasons, the corporate form is not the ideal modality for the kind of idiosyncratic 
initiative a U.S. corporate carbon fund presents.  First, the intensive filing and regulatory 
requirements of state corporation statutes make the corporate form a somewhat rigid and 
costly option.101  Second, the corporate form attracts double taxation; the corporate entity 
is taxed on income earned by it whilst distributions to its shareholders are also taxed as 
income to them.102  Instead, two other alternatives, the limited liability company and the 
business trust (as refined and expanded by statute), pose more attractive solutions.
(b) A Limited Liability Company
The limited liability company (“LLC”) is a creature of statute which first came into 
existence in 1977 in Wyoming in response to a demand from Hamilton Oil Company for 
an organizational form that would afford its owners limited liability but which would not 
be subject to the double-tax regime applicable to corporations.103  In the early days of the 
LLC’s existence, it was unclear whether an LLC would be classified as a corporation or a 
99 ROBERT HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING 
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, 33 (8th ed. 2003).
100 See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of The Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale 
L.J. 165, 184 (1997-98).
101See R. HAMILTON & J.R. MACEY supra note 99.
102See L. E. RIBSTEIN & R.R. KEATINGE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (2ND ED. 2003) at § 16:2.
103 Id. at §1:2 (quoting Hamill, The Origins Behind The Limited Liability Company, 59 Ohio St. LJ 1459 
(1998)).  Florida followed Wyoming’s lead in 1982 and passed the Florida Limited Liability Company Act,
Fla Stat  608.401-608.471 (supp. 1982), for the purpose, like Wyoming, of luring capital into the state.  Id.
(quoting Comment, The Florida Limited Liability Company Act, 11 Fla St UL Rev. 387 (1983)).
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partnership for federal tax purposes and so the form was not frequently used.104 This 
situation changed in 1988, when the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling clarifying 
that properly organized limited liability companies would be treated as partnerships. 
Following that ruling, all the remaining states that had not already done so adopted 
limited liability company statutes.105
An LLC is an unincorporated entity that is formed, or organized, through filing articles, 
or a certificate, with the state under a state limited liability company statute, the members 
and management of which do not have vicarious liability for the entity.106 Arrangements 
for the governance, management and other business affairs of the LLC, are usually set 
forth in an operating agreement107 or, where the parties have not agreed to the contrary, 
by the default provisions of the state LLC statute.108
The first LLC statutes contained several restrictions regarding the types of business that 
could be conducted under an LLC and the types of management and governance structure 
that could be used.109  Over time, however, most such restrictions have been 
eliminated.110 As a result, the LLC has become a very flexible modality under which 
parties can establish almost any management and economic structure.111   Members of the 
LLC may provide for management directly by the members themselves, or by a selected 
104 See L. E. RIBSTEIN & R.R. KEATINGE at 1:2
105 Id.
106 See id. at 1:3.
107See id. at 4:16.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1:4.
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group of managers, or by an external third party, engaged to manage the LLC.112  The 
choice of management and governance structure is largely unfettered; LLC members do 
not lose their limited liability for participating in the control of the business.113  The LLC 
statutes generally protect the creditors of LLCs, however, by imposing non-waivable 
requirements on the LLC regarding financial disclosures, distributions and dissolution.114
The extraordinary flexibility of the LLC make it, in many ways, an ideal modality for a 
pioneering fund, such as a U.S. corporate carbon fund, which is piloting a new form of 
endeavor for U.S. corporations, untested questions about the nature of participants’ 
interests in such a fund and a novel form of property, namely interests in greenhouse gas 
emission reductions earned from projects in other countries.   Such flexibility would 
allow the participants ample scope to determine how to structure the fund and to establish 
norms for the generation, ownership, distribution and transfer of emission reductions 
secured by the fund.
The flexibility of the LLC would also provide enormous latitude to participants to 
determine the nature and scope of their relationship, and the relationship of the new fund, 
with the World Bank in setting the parameters by which the Bank would manage the 
fund.  In this respect, however, the flexibility and relative newness of the LLC could 
prove a mixed blessing.  The World Bank, like most large inter-governmental 
organizations, is a creature of habit.  In the Prototype Carbon Fund and its progeny, it 
112 Id. at 2:3.
113 Id. at 1: 6 (noting that this is the principal distinction between LLCs and limited partnerships on which
LLC statutes otherwise are modeled closely in many respects).
114 Id. at 1:5
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serves as trustee and it has a long tradition of serving as a trustee of a wide range of trust 
funds.115  In these circumstances, the case for preferring an LLC over a trust fund would 
seem hard to make if a trust fund were a viable possibility.  As discussed below, 
establishing a trust fund is a viable possibility thanks to the evolution of the business trust 
form, whose origins long pre-date the LLC and which now exists in a parallel universe 
with the LLC.116
(c) A Business Trust
In contrast to the LLC, the business trust is the creature of case law.  The essence of the 
traditional trust is the creation of a three-way legal relationship between the creator of the 
trust (the settlor), the trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust according to which the 
settlor transfers legal title in the trust property to the trustee for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries, who thereby acquire equitable title in such property.117 The business trust, 
however, the dark horse of trust law,118 is a trust form with a difference.  In contrast to 
the traditional, or personal, trust, the business trust was designed from the start to provide 
a means for parties to establish a fund or other enterprise that would administer funds or 
carry out activities for the benefit, not of third parties, but of the settlors themselves. 119
Its purpose was to provide a medium for the conduct of business and a sharing of gains 
115 See IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 112-114 
(Franziska Tschofen and Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991).
116 See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 102, at 1:2 & 2:3.7.
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY, § 1 (1958) (an agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the 
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other so to act).    
118 See generally Langbein, supra note 100.  
119
 Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Statutory Trusts, in THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19.2 (3rd ed. 2005 Supp.)
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by the settlors. 120  Unlike the personal trust, the business trust is not, and never was, 
about conserving and managing private property for another generation.121
The business trust emerged as a legal modality to fill a lacuna in state corporate laws.
It was first used in Massachusetts in the nineteenth century to provide corporations, 
which were not permitted under Massachusetts law to deal in real estate, a means of 
owning real estate.122 Its use quickly spread to other states and during the nineteenth 
century it became a prominent device for the conduct of enterprise until general corporate 
statutes made the company form readily available.123  It survived the subsequent 
expanded availability of the corporate form because of its flexibility as a form and it 
recent times it has spearheaded a range of commercial activities, ranging from mutual 
funds to real estate investment trusts, to oil and gas royalty trusts.124  There is no set 
format for the creation of a business trust.125  Generally,126 the kind of governance 
structure and beneficial interests that can be established by such a trust are bounded only 
by the limits of the settlor’s imagination.127
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. Hence, as a modality, it is frequently referred to as a Massachusetts business trust. 
123
 Langbein, supra note 100, at 188-9.
124 Id.
125 See the discussion of the business trust in Nathan Isaacs, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1048, 1052 (1929) (“Foremost among the advantages of trusteeship over the standardized legal 
devices is its flexibility.  The document creating the trust is the law of the trust.  It may determine the types 
of business, the types of investment, the distinction to be made between corpus and income, and the use of 
both with the utmost freedom, according to the needs of the case.”)
126 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164(a) (1959) (“As in contract, the autonomy of a 
party is not wholly unrestrained.  For example, there are the obvious public policy prohibitions against 
trusts for illegal purposes.”)  
127
 Langbein, supra note 100, at 184-5 (suggesting that the trust’s inherent flexibility reflects the origins of 
the Anglo-American trust as a donative transfer.  Starting with the root principle that the owner of property 
has absolute freedom to give it away as he pleases (subject to perpetuities and dead hand protections), there 
was no reason to prevent the donor from tailoring whatever organizational regime he wanted to devise to 
for implementing the gift. In contrast, when the modern business corporation form emerged, it was 
encumbered with restrictions of a regulatory character, designed to protect creditors and shareholders).   
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Unlike the LLC, however, the business trust is rooted in a long-established legal tradition 
because the rules of law that apply to business trusts are the same rules that apply to 
trusts generally.128  Thus, as in the case of all trust law, the creators of the trust exercise 
considerable autonomy over the terms.129  The trust instrument is the supreme authority 
on what the terms of the trust require;130 the rules of trust law apply only when the trust 
instrument does not contain contrary terms.131  Thus, on its face, the business trust seems 
to allow for the flexibility that would allow the participants of a U.S. corporate carbon 
fund and the World Bank ample scope to determine how to structure the fund and what 
rights and duties the World Bank as trustee and they themselves, as participants should 
assume, whilst also establishing norms for generating, owning and transferring emission 
reductions.  
There is, however, one impediment to this largely unfettered flexibility on the design of a 
business trust which derives from the fact that there is a lingering uncertainty in the law 
of trusts on the question of whether participants in a business trust are protected from 
personal liability for the obligations of such a trust.132 Ordinarily, a beneficiary of a trust 
is not personally subject to liabilities to third parties incurred in the administration of a 
trust.133  Hence, a beneficiary is normally neither personally liable upon contracts made 
by the trustee in the administration of the trust nor personally liable to third parties for 
128 See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 247-251, 255 
(rev. 2d ed. 1992).
129 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts 105 Yale L.J. 625, 650 (1996) 
(noting that the trust, like the contract, is a consensual juridical relationship). 
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §164(a) (1959).
131 Id.
132 See Langbein, supra note 100, at 183 n.110.
133 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(e) (2003).
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torts committed by the trustee.134  However, if a trustee acts on behalf of the beneficiary 
and is subject to its control, the trustee becomes the beneficiary’s agent as well as its 
trustee, and in its capacity as the agent, it can render the beneficiary liable upon a contract 
made by the trustee and for torts committed by the trustee. 135
The key factor in determining whether or not a trustee is also an agent of the beneficiaries 
depends upon the extent of the beneficiaries’ right to control the trustee.136  If, as a group, 
the beneficiaries have the power, not merely to elect the trustee, but also to direct the 
conduct of the business by the trustee, the ‘trust” will be regarded as a partnership and the 
person designated as “trustee” will be held to be the agent of the partners.137
The control test was first enunciated in the context of the business trust in Williams v. 
Inhabitants of Milton.138 In that case, the court held that the beneficiaries of the business 
trust were liable for the debts of the trust upon a finding that the beneficiaries had the 
right to manage the trust assets and instruct the trustee as to the management of the trust 
property.139 The court also noted that the beneficiaries had the right to remove the trustee 
without cause and the subsequent right to fill any vacancies created, to terminate the trust, 
to transfer the trust to new trustees and to amend the trust instrument.140
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 274,275 & 276 (1959).
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 275 (cmt. e), §276 (com. b) (1959).
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 14(B) (cmt. d) (1958) (Where a number of persons transfer 
property to a person, designated as trustee, who is to do business with such property for their benefit, the 
relation thus created may be a partnership.  Whether or not it is a partnership depends upon the amount of 
control reserved by the contributors).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 14(B) (cmt. j) (1958).
138
 102 N.E. 355 (Mass. 1913); see also Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Statutory Trusts, in 
THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19.2 (3rd ed. 2005 Supp.)
139 Id.
140 Id.
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Subsequent instances of the courts applying the control test, however, have frequently 
yielded inconsistent results under seemingly similar circumstances.141  These results are 
often explicable on the basis of the state’s policy of prohibiting the settlor/beneficiaries of 
a business trust from achieving limited liability without complying with the state’s 
corporate franchise laws.142  Nonetheless, their inconsistency puts a pall on the flexibility 
of the business trust.  Although no single power retained by the participants over the 
trustee conclusively establishes personal liability in the participants,143  whenever the 
trust instrument provides for the active, ongoing involvement of the participants, the risk 
is impossible to dismiss under the case law.144
Under the case law analyzing the legal status of the business trust, it seems that providing 
for the participants of  a U.S. corporate carbon fund to have the kinds of powers exercised 
by the participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund and its progeny, in particular, the 
powers to vet all projects to decide whether to object to their inclusion in the fund’s 
portfolio,145 to review and approve the annual business plan and budget146 and to amend 
the project selection and portfolio criteria,147 would make such a fund vulnerable to being 
regarded as a partnership rather than a trust.  Absent such powers, the participants would 
141
 Fenton & Mazie, supra note 138, at § 19-7.
142 Id. at § 19-7 and n. 22.
143 See Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223 (1919).
144 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 128 at § 247(H); see also Bank of America National Trust & 
Savings Ass’n. v. Scully, 92 F2d. 97 (10th Cir. 1937), Earlsboro Gas Co. v. Vern H. Brown Drilling Co., 52 
P. 2d. 730 (1935), and Case v. Kadota Fig Ass’n of Producers, 207 P. 2d. (Cal. App. 1949).
145
 PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. VI, § 6(4)(c).
146 Id. at § 5.1(a).
147 Id. at § 5.1(b).  
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not have the kind of hands-on involvement they need to make participating in such a fund 
worthwhile from a business and learning perspective.
 To mitigate the risk that the uncertainty of the law in this area gives rise to, business 
trusts typically contain language in their constituent documents declaring that the 
participants shall not be liable for the obligations of the trust and indemnifying 
participants from the assets of the trust in the event that such declarations are 
disregarded.148 Similar migrating measures could be devised to enable the participants of 
a U.S. corporate fund to achieve their objective of being actively involved in the 
management of the fund.149 The law of Delaware, however, in the form of the Delaware 
Statutory Trust Act,150 has paved the way for a significant leap forward in the legal status 
of the business trust which provides much more comfort to the participants in a trust 
formed under the Act’s requirements, than any such mitigating measures can provide.  
(d) A Delaware Statutory Trust
148 Langbein, supra note 100, at n.110.  
149 The instrument of the Prototype Carbon Fund, for example, contains similar provisions.  It declares that 
it creates only the relationship of trustee and beneficiary between the trustee and the participants and that it 
is not the intention of the parties “to create a general partnership, limited partnership, joint stock 
association, corporation, bailment or any other form of legal relationship other than a trust.” See PCF 
Instrument, supra note 59, at art. II § 2.2.  It also provides that neither the Bank nor the participants will be 
subject to any personal liability to any third person in connection with the Fund’s activities and directs that 
all contracts entered into by the Bank as trustee of the Fund shall explicitly provide to that effect. Id. at art. 
XII, § 12.4. The instrument also provides for the indemnification of the participants from the Fund’s assets 
for any liability arising out of the activities of the trust, with the exception of liabilities resulting from a 
participant’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.  Id. at art. XII, § 12.2.  As this provision does not fully 
mitigate against the risk of tort liability, the Instrument also authorizes the Bank, as trustee, to use fund 
assets to pay for professional liability insurance to cover the participants. See id. at art. 8, § 8.1(j). 
Furthermore, under the agreements entered into between the participants and the Bank as trustee, the Bank 
agreed to use its best efforts to require the project entities, with which it contracts as trustee of the fund, to 
purchase emission reduction credits, to maintain appropriate general liability insurance to protect both the 
Bank and the participants against general liability claims that might arise from fund-sponsored projects.  
See Model Form Prototype Carbon Fund Participation Agreement, attached as Annex 1, at Section 4.1(d). 
150 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 12, §3801 (2005).  
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The Act, which was passed in 1988 (but has subsequently been amended several 
times),151 recognizes the statutory trust as an alternative form of business association and 
provides that all statutory trusts shall be regarded as separate legal entities.152  It 
expressly resolves the lingering ambiguity regarding the personal liability of the 
participants in a business trust overwhelmingly in favor of such participants.153  In doing 
so, it rejects the control test and instead provides certainty by stating that, except to the 
extent otherwise provided in the governing instrument of the statutory trust, the beneficial 
owners shall be entitled to the same limitation of personal liability extended to 
stockholders of Delaware corporations.154
The Act expressly permits the beneficial owners to participate in the management of the 
statutory trust without assuming the risk of assuming personal liability for the obligations 
of the trust.155  Moreover it provides that, subject to the provisions of the trust’s 
governing instrument, any person (including a beneficial owner) shall be entitled to direct 
the trustees in the management of the statutory trust.156  The Act is broad in scope.  It 
employs the widest possible definition of “statutory trust” and provides that the Act shall 
apply to any business trust, whenever created, that elects to be governed by the provisions 
thereof by filing a Certificate of Trust with the Delaware Secretary of State.157
151 The Delaware Business Trust Act was first codified in Chapter 38 of Title 12 of the Delaware Code, 12 
Del. Code §3801, which became effective October 1, 1988.  It was later amended in 66 Del. Laws, c. 279, 
67 Del. Laws, c. 297, 68 Del. Laws, c. 404, 69 Del. Laws, c. 265, 70 Del. Laws, c. 548, 71 Del. Laws, c. 
335, 72 Del. Laws, c. 387, 73 Del. Laws, c. 328, and 73 Del. Laws, c. 329. 
152 Id., supra n. 50  
153 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 12, §3803(a) (2005).
154 Id. 
155 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 12, §3806(a) (2005).
156 Id.  
157
 66 Del. Laws c. 279 §2; See also Fenton & Mazie, supra note 138, at §19.2.
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In sum, both the LLC statutes and the Delaware statutory trust afford a mechanism for 
U.S. corporations to form a U.S. corporate carbon fund in which they can be actively 
involved without being exposed to liability for the fund’s acts or omissions.    In doing 
so, they facilitate charting new territory by providing U.S. corporations with an 
opportunity to collectively pilot a project-based greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
mechanism whilst simultaneously gaining knowledge and experience in dealing with the 
developing world.
(ii)  Managing Potential Conflicts of Interest 
The specter of corporations, many of whom would ordinarily compete with other, 
collaborating together as co-participants in a business trust, is not an everyday 
phenomenon in U.S. corporate activity.158  Such collaboration raises an immediate need 
for a mechanism to manage potential conflicting interests. The participants’ collective 
interest in a U.S. corporate carbon fund would have to be balanced against their 
independent corporate interests as profit-making entities.  No participant, for example, 
would want its participation in such a fund to preclude it or its affiliates, from investing 
in projects associated with fund-sponsored projects, or in other funds or ventures that 
might compete with the fund.  At the same time, all participants would want the process 
for approving proposals for fund financing to have integrity.  
158 SEMATECH, a consortium of 14 U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturers formed in 1986 to work with 
the U.S. government to solve common manufacturing problems by leveraging resources and sharing risks, 
is a recent example of such an inter-corporation collaborative initiative.  SEMATECH raised antitrust 
concerns because it consisted solely of semiconductor manufacturers.  A U.S. corporate carbon fund could 
avoid raising such concerns by ensuring a diverse group of participants.
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The mechanism devised under the Prototype Carbon Fund for managing such potential 
conflicts of interests involves a two-part process requiring, (a) disclosure by a participant 
of any competing interest it has with the fund or with any project under consideration for 
fund approval; and (b) recusal by such a participant from participating in decisions of the 
Participants’ Committee and/or the Participants Meeting when the existence of the 
competing interest precludes the possibility of the participant’s objective participation.159
Thus, the Instrument requires a participant who has an interest in a project associated 
with a project being considered for funding by the Prototype Carbon Fund or in a venture 
that competes with the fund, to disclose that interest to the Bank as trustee, prior to the 
Participant Committee’s review of the pertinent project proposal.160
The Instrument provides for a self-policing mechanism to police implementation of this 
provision.  It gives the Bank, as trustee, the authority to determine whether the interest 
that a participant has disclosed is such that it should not take part in the Participant 
Committee’s deliberations on the project.161  If a participant disagrees with the Bank’s 
determination, it can advise the Participants’ Committee of the conflict or potential 
conflict.162 In such case, the Participants’ Committee (with the exception of the 
participant making the disclosure) has the power to decide whether the participant should 
be permitted to take part in the Participant’s Committee’s deliberations on the project.163
Further, the Bank as trustee, in consultation with the Participants’ Committee, can decide 
159
 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. XVII, § 17.2.
160 Id.
161
 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.  
S. SMYTH 09.22.05
48
on how to sanction a participant who fails to provide timely disclosure of a competing 
interest.164
Similar provisions would be necessary in any instrument establishing a U.S. corporate 
carbon fund in order to manage the potential conflicts of interests between the 
participants inter se and the participants and the fund.  A collaboration of U.S. 
corporations under the framework of an instrument containing similar provisions, which 
delegated a policing role to the trustee and a self-policing role to the corporations if a 
participant disagreed with the trustee’s determination, would be a new way of doing 
business in the U.S. corporate world. 
(iii)  Defining the Trustee’s Fiduciary Role
The World Bank would have a lot to bring to the role of trustee of the fund, given its 
experience as trustee of the Prototype Carbon Fund and progeny, and its vast experience 
as a provider of project-based lending to the developing world.  But both the participants 
and the Bank would have a strong interest in maintaining a clear divide between the 
activities of the Bank as a lender and its activities as trustee of a U.S. corporate carbon 
fund.   From the perspective of the Bank, the Bank has a long and involved relationship 
with all of its borrowing countries, each of which must be a member of the Bank in order 
to borrow from it.165  It lends directly to such countries and to other entities provided 
164
 Id. 
165
 IBRD Articles of Agreement III §1 (a) (stating the resources and the facilities of the Bank shall be used 
exclusively for the benefit of members with equitable consideration to projects for development and 
projects for reconstruction) available http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-
articlesofagreement.pdf (last viewed August 23, 2005).
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such loans are backed by a guarantee from a borrowing member country.  Thus, the Bank 
would probably not want to jeopardize these relationships by assuming obligations as 
trustee of a U.S. corporate carbon fund that might obligate it to pursue a claim against a 
member county or a project entity on behalf of the fund.  
Such reticence to make the needs of the fund a priority would not square readily with the 
duties of a trustee.  Ordinarily, a trustee is under a duty to the trust beneficiaries to 
administer the trust solely in the beneficiaries’ interests and to take reasonable steps to 
enforce claims held in trust.166  True to the principle of the supremacy of the trust deal, 
however, this general principle of trust law does not apply, if the terms of the trust 
instrument expressly provide otherwise.167
In the case of the Prototype Carbon Fund, the Bank and the participants addressed this 
concern by agreeing that the Instrument would absolve the Bank, as trustee, from any 
obligation to pursue any action or claim on the participants’ behalf against any project 
entity or Host Country that defaulted on its agreements.168  The Instrument stops short of 
determining how such actions or claims will be pursued if the Bank as trustee does decide 
to refrain.  It simply provides that the Bank as trustee and the participants will use their 
best efforts to agree on satisfactory arrangements for dealing with any such dispute, 
including, if necessary  the assignment and transfer of all or part of the trustee’s rights 
and obligations under the agreement in dispute to a third party.169    To date, the 
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 177 (1959).
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 164 (1959).
168
 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. XVII, § 17.1.
169 Id.
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provisions of these clauses have not yet been invoked and so the tough task of deciding 
what to do in the event of such a claim has been put off until another day.
The instrument of a U.S. corporate carbon fund could contain a similar provision that 
excuses the World Bank from having to pursue such claims on behalf of the fund as 
necessary.  The Delaware Statutory Trust Act, however, offers a better solution than the 
vagueness of the Prototype Carbon Fund’s provisions.  It allows the beneficiaries of a 
statutory trust to bring a derivative action on behalf of the trust to assert the trust’s 
claims.
From the perspective of the participants in a U.S. corporate carbon fund, ensuring 
disentanglement between the affairs of the Bank and the affairs of such a fund would 
protect them from having their interests as fund participants be at the mercy of the 
vagaries of the Bank’s long established and multifaceted relationship with its borrowing 
member countries.  To avoid such entanglement in the case of the Prototype Carbon 
Fund, the Bank and the participants agreed that there would be no cross-default clause in 
the Bank’s loan agreements that would entitle the Bank to exercise remedies in the event 
of a default under an agreement between the Bank as trustee of the Prototype Carbon 
Fund and a host country or project entity. 170  They also agreed that there would not be 
any cross-default clause in the agreements entered into by the Bank as trustee that would 
allow the exercise of remedies under those agreements in the event of a default under any 
Bank loan agreement.171  Including similar undertakings in the arrangements entered into 
170 See Standard Form Prototype Carbon Fund Participation Agreement, attached as Annex 1.
171 Id.
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between the Bank as trustee of a U.S. corporate carbon fund and the participants in such 
fund would protect the interests of all parties.  Providing for such boundaries would also 
serve as a precedent for future collaborations between the private sector and the World 
Bank concerning pooled funds for international development aid.
 (iv) Integrating the Host Countries’ Perspective
Current thinking on the most effective way to provide international development aid 
stresses the importance of consulting with the intended recipient of such aid on the 
recipient’s priorities for its economy.172  Such consultation is regarded as critical 
regardless of whether the aid is to be provided in the form of foreign direct investment, 
loans or grants.173  It is especially emphasized in the realm of international environmental 
development where the notion of an equitable sharing of benefits is embedded in the 
concept of sustainable development.174  Part of ensuring that developing countries receive 
an equitable share of the benefits involves allowing them to have input in how such 
sharing will be achieved.
Given the importance attached to allowing for developing country input (also commonly 
referred to as “developing country voice”), the willingness of the World Bank to serve as 
172 See James D. Wolfensohn, The Challenges of Globalization: The Role of the World Bank. Address to the 
Bundestag, Berlin, Germany (April 2, 2001) (arguing that people who live in poverty should be treated as a 
creative asset that will contribute more than anyone else to eradicate poverty.  They do not want charity, 
they want a chance, and community-based development programs provide such an opportunity).
173
 The Bank uses a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) to guide all of its activities in client countries.  
These strategies, based on the countries’ own vision of development, arise from consultation with country 
authorities, development partners, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders.  See The World Bank 
Group Annual Report 2004 available at
http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2004/country_priorities.html (last viewed August 30, 2005).
174
 See generally, Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging 
Legal Principles in Winfried Lang, ed., Sustainable Development and International Law, Boston: Graham 
& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 53-66 (1995).
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trustee of a U.S. corporate carbon fund would be conditional on such fund having a 
process which allows for meaningful consultation with the developing and EIT countries 
who would serve as host countries to the projects from which the fund would purchase 
emission reductions.
In the Prototype Carbon Fund, the goal of involving the host countries in the fund’s work 
is achieved by a ground-breaking mechanism, the inclusion of a Host Country Committee 
as a part of the funds’ governance structure.175  The Host Country Committee is 
composed of representatives of host countries and potential host countries (countries that 
have given written endorsement of project proposals under consideration by the fund).176
Its role consists of providing guidance to the Bank and the participants on the funds’ 
development and implementation, which includes giving advice on proposed 
amendments to the fund’s project selection and portfolio criteria and on effecting an 
equitable sharing between fund participants and the host countries of any greenhouse gas 
emission reductions arising from fund-sponsored projects.177  The Host Country 
Committee meets at least annually at locations designed to allow for interaction with fund 
participants.178  Further, representatives of the Host County Committee attend 
Participants’ Meetings and Participants’ Committee Meetings as observers in order to 
further strengthen the interaction between the fund and the host countries.179
175 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at Art. VII §7.1.  Subsequent funds, such as the Community 
Development Carbon Fund and the BioCarbon Fund also include Host Country Committees as part of the 
funds’ governance structure to involve the host countries in the funds’ work.  See CDCF Instrument, Art I 
§1.1 (36); See also BioCarbon Fund Instrument, Art I §1.1 (45).  
176 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8 (All projects undertaken pursuant to the Kyoto Mechanisms must be 
endorsed, in advance, by the host country).
177
 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at Art. VII, § 7.2. 
178
 Id, at art. VII, § 7.4.
179
 Id. at art. VII, § 7.3.
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The inclusion of the Host County Committee in the structure of the Prototype Carbon 
Fund and its progeny was highly novel in the extent to which it allowed for meaningful 
participation by non-contributing developing countries and EIT countries in the work of 
those funds.  Including a similar provision in a U.S. corporate carbon fund would benefit 
both the participants and the intended recipients of fund financing and pave the way for 
improved country focus in collaborations between the private sector, the public sector 
and international organizations for the involvement of the private sector in international 
development aid.
(v) Administering a Portfolio of Emission Reductions
A U.S. corporate carbon fund would involve pioneering implementation of a U.S. 
project-based mechanism for achieving greenhouse gas emission reductions that is yet to 
be developed.  Thus, the provisions of the fund detailing the rights and obligations of the 
participants and the trustee with respect to such emission reductions would have to be 
framed in flexible terms which takes the evolving nature of the U.S. framework into 
account and allows the participants’ interests in the reductions, and the trustee’s 
responsibilities with respect to them, to evolve too. 
A similar state of uncertainty pertained when the Prototype Carbon Fund was established. 
There was no agreed modality or consensus at that time as to the nature of the 
instruments that would reflect the participants’ interests in their pro rata shares of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions.  The precise nature of the Bank’s obligations as 
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trustee with respect to such instruments was, therefore, unknown, as was the scope of the 
Bank’s responsibilities to administer a portfolio of emission reduction credits. 
The instrument for the Prototype Carbon Fund takes account of this uncertainty by 
framing the Bank’s responsibilities in broad, non-specific terms.  Thus, it provides that 
the Bank, as trustee, will facilitate the process of validating, verifying, and certifying 
emission reductions earned by fund-sponsored projects without giving any indication as 
to what such facilitation would entail.180  Similarly, it provides that the Bank as trustee 
will facilitate the transfer of greenhouse gas emission reductions from the host countries 
to the participants without specifying what the Bank should do181
Such broadly worded powers strain the flexibility of the trust device to its limits because 
of the difficulty vague powers pose for a court charged with determining whether they 
have been properly discharged. Given that the circumstances would preclude being more 
specific, however, including such powers in the instrument of a U.S. corporate carbon 
fund would be unlikely to invalidate the trust. 
The instrument for the Prototype Carbon Fund explicitly exempts the Bank from any 
responsibility to ensure that greenhouse gas emission reductions earned by the Fund will 
180 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. III, §3.2.  The instruments for the Community Development 
Carbon Fund, the BioCarbon Fund, the Netherlands Clean Development Facility, the Italian Carbon Fund, 
the Netherlands European Carbon Facility, the Spanish Carbon Fund, and the Danish Carbon Fund contain 
similar provisions.
181 See Information Statement for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2004), 
available at http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital+Markets (last viewed August 15, 2005).  See 
also PCF Instrument, supra note 59 at art. III, § 3.2, Art. VIII § 8.4.  The instruments for the Community 
Development Carbon Fund, the BioCarbon Fund, the Netherlands Clean Development Facility, the Italian 
Carbon Fund, the Netherlands European Carbon Facility, the Spanish Carbon Fund, and the Danish Carbon 
Fund contain similar provisions.
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be credited under the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol.182  It provides that the Bank will  
“endeavor to ensure” that the contractual arrangements entered into among it, the 
participants, and the host countries and project entities will be “structured flexibly so as 
to enable them to conform with the guidelines, modalities and procedures of the 
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol if, when, and as they are 
developed.”183 An equivalent exemption would be appropriate to include in the 
instrument of a U.S. corporate carbon fund; it is well established under trust principles 
that a trustee may limit its liability to the beneficiaries of the trust.184
Lastly, the instrument of the Prototype Carbon Fund explicitly authorizes the Bank as 
trustee to carry out its duties by engaging qualified third parties to perform those 
functions in accordance with relevant standards and criteria “to be developed under the 
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC and/or national laws.” 185  It also authorizes the 
Bank as trustee to engage third persons to serve as registrar, transfer agent, or custodians 
in respect of the Fund’s property, including instruments evidencing participants’ 
entitlement to greenhouse gas emission reductions, as necessary.186
Trust law principles freely allow a trustee to engage experts to discharge certain functions 
in this manner.187  Drawing upon the Prototype Carbon Fund as a precedent, a U.S. 
corporate carbon fund could and should provide that the Bank as trustee could engage 
182
 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. XIII, §13.3.
183
 Id. at art. XIII, §13.1.
184 See generally, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 128.
185 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. III, §3.2 & art. VIII §8.4.
186
 Id. at art. VIII, § 8.4.
187 See generally Langbein, supra note 129.
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qualified third parties to verify and certify emission reductions purchased by the fund in 
accordance with standards and criteria to be developed under U.S. environmental 
regulations.  A similar express authority to retain third persons to serve as registrar, 
transfer agent or custodian, would also facilitate the operation of such a fund.
The need for fund participants to receive reports on the scope of their pro rata shares in 
emission reductions secured by the fund, can readily be integrated into standard trustee 
reporting procedures effected to meet a trustee’s duty to report to beneficiaries under 
principles of trust law.188  In the case of the Prototype Carbon Fund, for example, the 
Bank as trustee reports bi-annually to fund participants on the operation of the Fund and 
provides each participant with a statement of account regarding its share of Fund property 
at that time.189  The instrument goes further than the standard reporting obligation by 
providing that the Bank as trustee will produce a statement of account, upon a 
participant’s request, which confirms the participant’s pro rata share of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions held by the fund.190  Given the novel nature of the property interests 
involved, a similar provision would be an appropriate addition to the instrument of a U.S. 
corporate carbon fund to give added comfort to the participants.
B.  A Novel Form of Property
The formation of a U.S. corporate carbon fund would also pose some issues of first 
impression under securities and tax laws, including, for example, the issue of whether 
188 See generally Langbein, supra note 129.
189
 See PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. X, §10.4.
190
 Id. at art. XIII, §13.2.
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participants’ interests in  a U.S. corporate carbon fund would constitute securities; and 
how such interests would be treated for tax purposes.  
(1) Interests in a U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund as Securities
Analyzing the securities law regime as it might apply to a U.S. corporate carbon fund 
illustrates how such laws will have to adapt to accommodate the new forms of rights and 
interests to which a regime of mandatory emission reductions will give rise.  The 
importance of determining whether interests in a U.S. corporate carbon fund would 
constitute securities derives from the fact that the offer for sale, sale and transfer of 
securities is a highly regulated activity at both the state and federal level.  Thus, both the
World Bank as the creator and trustee of the fund, and fund participants, would need to 
know whether and how federal securities laws and regulations and state securities laws 
would apply.191
U.S. law employs a very broad definition for what constitutes a “security.”  A “security,” 
according to the United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,192 is something 
that creates a “financial relationship” between the parties and looks like an “investment 
contract.”193 Further, an “investment contract,” according to the Supreme Court, has 
certain key characteristics:  it is a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person 
191
 As an international organization, the World Bank is immune from the application of U.S. and state 
securities laws (“Blue Skies laws”) under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 USCS §288 
(2005).  It has always been the Bank’s practice, however, to voluntarily complies with the requirements of 
such laws as a means of preserving investor confidence in securities issued by it, See Information Statement 
for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2004), available at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital+Markets (last viewed August 15, 2005). Consistent with this 
practice, the Bank would be vigilant in ensuring that any entity for which it were to act as trustee or 
manager, diligently complied with applicable securities laws requirements.
192 See SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
193 Id. at 298-299.
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invests money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits, derived solely or 
essentially from the efforts of the promoter of the enterprise or a third party.194
Examining the prospective interests of participants in a U.S. corporate carbon fund under 
this definition, a strong case could be made that such interests would be regarded as 
securities.  The fund would give rise to a financial relationship between the participants 
inter se and between the participants and the Bank as trustee.  Additionally, it would 
involve the investment of money in a common enterprise, with the expectation of earning 
greenhouse gas emission reductions which would be derived from the efforts of parties 
other than the participants.195 A key reason for participants’ involvement would be to 
obtain emission reductions which they hope would count against any future domestic or 
international legal obligations to reduce their emission reductions that might accrue to 
them in the future, or which they could sell for profit.
On the other hand, an argument could be made that the participants’ hopes of achieving 
profit from their investment in such a fund is too speculative to constitute an actual 
expectation of profit. 196  The emission reductions that the participants will earn from 
their investment in the fund are to count against obligations which at this point are merely 
194 Id.
195 See SEC v. Banner Fund International, 211 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that beneficial interests 
in a business trust constitute securities under the Howey test).
196 See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), for example, where the Supreme 
Court held that an insignificant profit motive will not satisfy the expectation of profit requirement.  This 
was echoed in the Court’s later decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 
(1979).  There is also some support for the view that the profit motive must be the primary factor in the 
marketing of the investment, see e.g. Teague v. Bakker, 139 F. 3d. 892, 1998 WL 168876 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(unpublished) (affirming lower court decision), although this decision has been described as 
“questionable.”  See also THOMAS HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §1.6[2][C] (4th Ed. 
2002).
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putative, potential future obligations that are still evolving supports this view.  Further, 
the involvement of the World Bank, which is a development institution, not a for profit 
entity, and the fact that the fund would effect a transfer of technology and funds to the 
developing world  and that participants could see their participation as prompted 
primarily by corporate social responsibility concerns, would support this view.
The question of whether or not interests in the fund would constitute securities is 
significant because of the impact it has on the manner in which interests in the fund could 
be marketed.   The thrust of both state and federal securities laws is to require the issuer 
of securities to make full and complete disclosure to potential investors of financial and 
other information concerning the issuer which will enable the investor to make an 
informed decision on whether or not to assume the risk of investing in the issuer’s 
securities.197  The securities laws achieve this objective, in part, by requiring issuers to (i) 
file detailed information concerning their finances and operations with the SEC or 
equivalent state regulatory authority; and (ii) make such information about themselves, 
and the securities to be issued, available to potential investors.198  Thus, the World Bank, 
as trustee of the fund, would either file information on the fund with the SEC and state 
authorities in accordance with applicable registration requirements or conduct its  
marketing activities in respect of the fund  in accordance with the requirements of the 
“private placement exemption” to the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (the “1933 
Act”).199
197 HAZEN, supra note 198, at §4.20[3][B] (describing the type of information an issuer is required to 
supply to purchasers).  See also 17 C.F.R. §230.502(b)(2)(i)(A).
198 Id.
199
 The pertinent provision of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 is set out in 15 U.S.C. §77d(2) .   
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Under the “private placement exemption”, transactions “not involving any public 
offering” are exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.200  The 
exemption is premised on the notion that not all investors are equal and that institutional 
investors that are sufficiently sophisticated and have sufficiently strong bargaining 
positions do not need the protections of federal registration.201
The parameters of this exemption have evolved through case law.  In SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., the Supreme Court established guidelines for the application of the 
exemption.202  It held that the exemption only applies if: (1) the offering is made to a 
limited number of offerees, all of whom have access to the type of information that would 
be contained in a registration statement filed under the 1933 Act; (2) the offerees are 
sufficiently sophisticated to demand and interpret the information provided to them; and 
(3) the offering is of a limited size both in terms of the number of securities offered and 
the aggregate offering price.203  The Court also indicated that the requirement that the 
offer be made only to a limited number of offerees is more readily established if it can be 
shown that the issuer has a pre-existing relationship with the offerees.204
200 Id.
201 HAZEN, supra note 198, at §4.24[1] (“The exemption for non-public offerings applies to offerings to 
institutional investors that are sufficiently sophisticated and have sufficiently strong bargaining positions”).    
See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(d)(6).
202
 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 73 S.Ct. 981 (1953).
203 Id.
204 Id.
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The burden of proof for establishing that the exemption applies lies on the party claiming 
its protection.205  That party must show that the exemption’s requirements are met not 
only with respect to each purchaser but also with respect to each offeree.206  Indeed, the 
exemption has been held not to apply where the issuer could adduce no evidence 
concerning the actual number of offerees, the offerees’ particular characteristics or of a 
relationship between the issuer and numerous offerees.207  Further, any public advertising 
is regarded as inconsistent with a claim of a private offering.208 And the use of investment 
seminars and other promotional meetings will lead to the denial of the exemption.209
The SEC adopted the safe harbor rule contained in Rule 506210 to provide additional 
clarity on the application of the private placement exemption.   Transactions that qualify 
for Rule 506’s safe harbor are exempt from state law registration requirements.211
The obligation to market interests in a U.S. corporate carbon fund within the boundaries 
of this exemption would have wide-sweeping ramifications.  The constraint on the nature 
of potential participants who could be approached and the size of the fund would not be a 
problem; the fund would be designed for corporate, not retail, participants, and a 
reasonable maximum size of the fund (consistent with its pilot nature) would be $150 
205 See Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Kane v. SEC, 842 . 
F.2d. 194 (5th Cir. 1988).
206
 See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d. 633 (9th Cir. 1980).  
207
 Kunz v. SEC, (10th Cir. 2003), 64 Fed. Appx. 659 (2003) WL1605865 (unreported); see also Mark v. 
FSC Securities Corp., 870 F.2d. 331 (6th Cir. 1989) (the absence of evidence as to actual number of offerees 
precluded reliance on the private placement exemption). 
208
 Non-Public Offering Exemption, SEC Act Rel. No. 33-4552, 1962 W.L. 3573.
209 See Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
210 17 C.F. R. Section 230.506
211 HAZEN, supra note 198 at §4.25 (noting that in 1996 Congress preempted the states’ ability to apply 
their Blue Sky registration requirements to many transactions).
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million, the size of the Prototype Carbon Fund.212  But the constraints on the number of 
offerees could hurt the fund’s prospects of success.  Such constraints would entail limits 
on the kinds of meetings that could be held, the number of attendees that could be 
allowed and the nature of the written and internet communications that could be made; all 
such communications would have to be devoid of anything that could be construed as an 
exhortation to participate in the fund.213
A key concern in introducing an innovative fund of this sort would be the need to educate 
the private sector on how it would work, the opportunities it would provide for piloting a 
U.S. project-based mechanism, and the implications for industry over the long term.  The 
very newness of these concepts cries out for an extensive and aggressive marketing 
campaign.  Ideally, such a campaign would include holding conferences, meetings with 
industry and government representatives and a US-wide road show to convey information 
on the terms and proposed size of the fund and predictions relating to its performance and 
the value of the greenhouse gas emission reductions that fund-sponsored projects would 
generate.   The rigid requirements of the private placement exemption are directly at odds 
with these needs. 
Such constraints would also be at odds with the United States’ and U.S. industry’s 
broader need to highlight voluntary action being taken to reduce global warming in the 
face of ongoing global criticism of the U.S. for its decision not to ratify the Kyoto 
212
 PCF Instrument, supra note 59, at art. II, §2.3. This figure was subsequently raised to US$180 million 
by Res. No. 2000-1 of the Exec. Dirs. of the IBRD.
213
 15 U.S.C.A. §77d(2).  See also HAZEN, supra note 198, at §4.24, §4.25 (Under Section 4(2) of the 1933 
Act, the number of investors would be limited to 35 plus an unlimited number of accredited investors and 
general solicitation is not permitted).
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Protocol.214 Further, they would undermine the World Bank’s institutional mandate to be 
open and transparent.215  Such constraints gave rise to many tensions when the Prototype 
Carbon Fund was established.216  Given these special circumstances; the involvement of 
the World Bank, and the tight fit between the goals of the fund and the exhortation by the 
Bush Administration to U.S. greenhouse gas emitting industries to pursue voluntary 
measures, the formation of this fund217 forces the issue of how and when the SEC and 
state securities regulators will integrate this new regime of mandatory controls and the 
interests that flow from them, within their purview. 
 (I1) Interests in a U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund as Taxable Interests
Full exploration of the tax implication of a U.S. corporate carbon fund is beyond the 
scope of this article.  Whether established as a business trust or an LLC, the fund’s tax 
status would be governed by the all-encompassing “check the box” regulations finalized 
on December 18, 1997.218  Under those regulations, an entity, such as the fund, can elect
whether to be treated as a corporation or a partnership.219  An organization which elects 
214 The Bush Administration’s environmental record, especially its repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
received much foreign criticism in 2001. For example, see Suraje Dessai, The Climate Regime from The 
Hague to Marrakech: Saving or Sinking the Kyoto Protocol?  Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research 
Working Paper 12 (2001).  
215 See IBRD, World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information, available at http://web.worldbank.org/
(last viewed August 15, 2005).
216
 At the time the Prototype Carbon Fund was established, NGOs claimed that the World Bank, by 
establishing the fund, was helping the Western World at the expense of developing countries by plucking 
“the low hanging fruit” that would earn emission reductions for those Western nations.  See  S. Smyth, The 
Prototype Carbon Fund:  A New Departure in International Trusts and Securities Law, Vol. V, Issue 2, 
Sustainable Development Law & Policy 28 (Spring 2005).
218 See Treasury Decision 8697, 61 Fed. Reg 66584 (1996), finalizing Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-1 through 
301.770-4.
218
 See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 102, at 16:1.  See also U.S. Treasury Regulations §§ 301. 77.01-
1, 2, 3, & 4.
219 Id.
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to be treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes is not subject to taxation.220  Rather, 
income, gain, deduction and losses and credits are reported by the owners as partners.221
The fund, however, would be required to file a federal tax return and to compute income 
and deductions.222  Further, the participants would be required to appoint one participant 
as the tax matters partner.223  Tax notices and other communications from the Internal 
Revenue Service would be addressed to such participant.  Thus, the World Bank as 
trustee of the fund, would be responsible for securing from the participants the 
information necessary to file such return.  Whilst liability to pay the tax would fall to the 
participants, the World Bank, as trustee could be subjected to direct personal liability if it 
failed to file a return on the trust’s behalf.224
The novel issues of tax law the fund would present both under federal and state tax law
arise with respect to the nature of the res being taxed, namely, emission reductions.  A 
decision would have to be made, for example, as to when the emission reductions would 
become taxable to the participants and on what basis, so as to avoid their having a tax 
liability for property not yet within their possession.  Additional questions would arise 
with respect to such issues as to how participants’ profit or loss on the emission 
reductions would be calculated and as to the extent to which they might amortize their 
initial investment in the fund.  Given that the fund would represent an implementation of 
the kind of voluntary greenhouse gas reduction measures being urged by the current 
220
 IRC §701.
221 Id.
222 U.S. Treasury Regulations §§ 301. 77.01- 1, 2, 3, & 4.
223 Id.
224 Id.
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Administration to reduce global warming, and constitute a response to the calls on the 
U.S. to increase its international development aid, it is possible that fund participants 
could garner political will in favor of achieving favorable private letter rulings from the 
Treasury and state tax authorities on these questions.  
Conclusion
The formation of a U.S. corporate carbon fund would be a path-breaking integration of 
environment and business principles, which would also render significant benefits to the 
developing world.  The language of climate change and global warming is fast becoming 
part of the corporate landscape; a corporate carbon fund is a way to make it a welcome 
part.  Moreover, private sector involvement in international development aid is fast being 
recognized as a welcome and necessary part of the global international development aid 
effort225, whose needs far outstrip the availability of public resources.  A U.S. corporate 
carbon fund would serve as a template for increased private sector involvement in 
international development aid.  Win/win opportunities are a rare phenomenon in every 
walk of life.  U.S. industry should seize upon this one. 
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 See, TONY ADDISON & GEORGE MAVROTAS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, INNOVATIVE SOURCES OF 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION (WORLD INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS RESEARCH) (2004) John Micklewright and Anna Wright, Private Donations for International 
Development (Discussion Paper No. 2003/82) (United Nations University) (December 2003); Lisa Drei, 
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